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10 May 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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South Vietnam: [President Diem shows no inclination to liberalize his regime despite discontent within the government and rising public criticism. Isolated from this dissatisfaction, he dismisses his local critics as opportunists, crackpots, or crypto-Communists. Diem has, however, indicated concern over international reaction, particularly American, to criticism of his government.]

Iraq: The Qasim regime, trying to block attempts by anti-regime elements to take control of the socialistic National Democratic party, has nullified the election of party leaders representing the faction of the party led by Kamil Chadirchi. The Chadirchi faction has demanded withdrawal of the party's support for Qasim. This move strengthens party elements led by Muhammad Hadid, minister of finance who resigned from the cabinet last week, presumably as a tactical move. The Hadid faction insists on the party's participation in the cabinet.

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Belgian Congo: Increasing instances of violence in the Belgian Congo, stemming both from political factors and from historic tribal rivalries, pose a serious threat to internal security. Police appear reluctant to intervene in any dispute having political or tribal overtones, thereby leaving responsibility for public order to the Force Publique, consisting of Belgian officers and native troops. Some Africans as well as Europeans fear that the security situation will deteriorate further following proclamation of the Congo's independence on 30 June.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Growing Pressure for Liberalization in South Vietnam

[South Vietnamese President Diem thus far has shown no inclination to liberalize his regime despite discontent within the government and rising public criticism. He holds that the Communist threat to the nation requires firm leadership, and views any concessions in the other direction as dangerous, if not fatal, under present circumstances. This inflexible stand largely proceeds from Diem's tough-minded personality, but a contributing factor is that subordinate officials do not yet have the temerity to speak in his presence on this issue.]

[A number of important Vietnamese figures, including high government officials, labor organizers, members of the National Assembly, and leaders of political parties have privately expressed their discontent and frustration with their "puppet" roles. Their complaint is that Diem's refusal to delegate authority beyond a tight circle of relatives and close associates has paralyzed effective government, fostered favoritism and corruption, and facilitated Communist subversion. The venal activities of the government's elite political instrument--the Can Lao organization, led by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu--are basic to much of this criticism. Resentment extends even to the military, to a lesser known degree, as a result of the Can Lao's efforts to establish political cells among the armed forces.]

[Diem scores public criticism of his regime as the work of opportunists, crackpots, or crypto-Communists. He has expressed disdain for the public petition for more democratic practices issued in Saigon on 30 April by a group of former Vietnamese government officials and civic leaders. However, he has indicated concern over international reaction,]

Continuing Disorders Threaten Internal Security  
In Belgian Congo

Increasing instances of violence in the Belgian Congo, stemming both from political factors and from historic tribal rivalries, pose a serious threat to internal security. Disorders in Stanleyville and Luluabourg from 3 to 5 May have heightened anxiety among Europeans, many of whom plan to leave the Congo before it becomes independent on 30 June. The Stanleyville riots of 3 May, in which European cars were stoned, were the first major instance of violence directed against Europeans.

The primary agency for internal security in the Congo remains the 28,000-man, Belgian-officered Force Publique. Despite occasional reports which have cast doubt on its political reliability, the Force Publique to date has stayed aloof from Congolese politics and has been a major stabilizing factor in the colony. In the past year, however, it has been hard pressed to maintain order between the Lulua and Baluba tribes in Kasai Province, where intermittent warfare has cost several hundred lives. The absence of any formal agreement concerning the status of the Force Publique following the Congo's independence has been a source of apprehension to many Africans as well as Europeans.

Among the factors detrimental to the maintenance of order are inflammatory oratory in connection with the current campaign for a Congo legislature, the inability of Congolese leaders to control their followers, and the general excitement of the populace in anticipation of independence. The consulate general in Leopoldville reports an increasing reluctance on the part of the police to intervene in cases of violence having political or tribal overtones.

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